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Abstract 
This paper explores critical aspects of the agency of youngsters in situations of crisis. Throughout 
the political-military conflict in Côte d‟Ivoire (2002-2011), the patriotic militias were the locus of 
extensive networking and, to the extent that this was informed by political or ideological choices, 
vast enterprises of civil society building. In this paper, I focus on the performative and social 
dimension of youth militia activity: (a) the sustained attempts by youngsters to insinuate 
themselves into the armed forces by „impersonation‟, and (b) the wider and often intricate 
processes of networking and hierarchism within which these persistent pursuits of social mobility 
took place. Rather than to capture the wider transformations triggered by these processes in 
narrow analytical concepts such as „brutalisation‟ and „militianisation‟, this paper considers them 
to be the contingent outcome of competencies, mobility, and creativity of youngsters whose 
performative, social, and physical trajectories transform public life. This paper thus seeks to make 
the point that the long post-war (post-2002), or rather pre-peace, multiplication of militias and 
their growing impact on social and political life, constituted a protracted, multifaceted and multi-
sited process which we can productively begin to disentangle in terms of social mobility albeit of a 
juvenile and subaltern kind. 
                                                 
1
 In memory of General Ato Bely   
2
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Introduction 
This paper addresses the issue of social mobility of the youth whose condition has at times been 
described in terms of hyper-mobility (Richards and Chauveau, 2007) or extreme immobility, 
verging on „social death‟ (Vigh, 2006). Particularly in the contexts in which these apparent 
opposite conditions have been observed – those of heavy societal turbulence sometimes 
accompanied by widespread violence (Arnaut and Højbjerg, 2008) – the saying applies that „the 
extremes meet‟. Both predicaments imply a lack of enabling attachments provoking extreme 
rootlessness hence making youngsters „mobilisable‟ or exploitable for different sorts of mostly 
violent enterprises (Chauveau and Richards, 2007), or leading to extreme „stuckness‟ and isolation 
which youngsters try to overcome by grasping the opportunities offered by war and turmoil (Vigh, 
2006). Taking its lead from these insights, this paper wishes to extend the focus beyond the 
immediate violent context by exploring the longer term goals and aspirations of the youngsters 
under consideration (Raeymaekers, 2011, Argenti, 2007, Diouf, 2003, Hall and Jefferson, 2006 
(1993)). 
Several successful attempts have been made to take into account pre- and/or post-conflict 
continuities. Hoffman (2007b: 640), for one, stressed the socialisation processes that preceded 
militia-formation by documenting how the erstwhile Sierra Leonean „militia‟ Civil Defence 
Forces was the product of “the militarisation of a web of social relations”. Another attempt in that 
respect is Utas‟ (2005) who followed these changing relations into the post-conflict era; but more 
importantly for our present purposes, he looked at how wartime structures and competencies were 
being transferred into peace-time Liberia, in the field of democratic politics (Christensen and Utas, 
2008, but see also: Hoffman, 2007a, 2011).  
In a similar vein, the present paper looks at social networking and professional advancement, in 
other words at life-making projects (Raeymaekers, forthcoming), which youngsters seek to realise 
under the guise of military action. Considerable insight has been gained by looking into processes 
of „militianisation‟ or the capturing of youth constituencies in the proliferation of militias 
(Banégas, 2008, Ngodi, 2006). However, within the on-going quest to strike the right balance on 
youth agency (Honwana, 2000, Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004, Vigh, 2009, Utas and Jörgel, 
2008), „militianisation‟ could be argued to unduly stress youth‟s instrumentalisation and preclude 
any consideration of social mobility. In order not to fall into the other extreme (Raeymaekers, 
s.d.), this paper suggests a triple movement.  
The first move operates a reversal of agency and tries to discern in the narratives of the militia 
members, attempts to insinuate themselves into on-going processes of militianisation for purposes 
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of professional and social advancement. The second move consists in documenting the 
deployment of this agency which, unsurprisingly, is of a largely tactical nature that can best be 
described in de Certeaunian terms of „détournement‟ or „misuse‟ (De Certeau, 1984). Finally, the 
third move is a theoretical one in that it tries to reconceptualise youth agency in these contexts as 
spatial and embodied performance. The turmoil of crisis, it is argued, elicits border transgressions 
of different kinds or, stated otherwise, opens transgressive spaces in which youth can occupy 
aspired positions by enactment. The kind of enactment which I call here impersonation combines 
mimicry with aspiration and heralds the insinuation of youngsters in particular fields (security, 
politics, etc.). The impersonation anticipates social mobility in the post-conflict era and can, 
occasionally, be the basis of societal innovation. 
More concretely, this paper addresses the recent conflict in Côte d‟Ivoire since the insurgency of 
2002 (see: McGovern, 2011). First it looks at the process of massive mobilisation into the 
different pro-presidential militias (Chelpi-den Hamer, 2011). This, I argue, was to some extent 
propelled by the expectation of youngsters that joining the militia meant approaching the regular 
defence and security forces – 'the dressed-up corps' or le corps habillé – and eventually joining it. 
What followed for most of the militia members was a short but dreadful decade of trying to cling 
on, and keep mobilised, or at least of staying connected with military or political entrepreneurs or 
„big men‟ who could remobilise them in time to join one reintegration programme or another into 
the regular defence and security forces. The subaltern tactics of the destitute militia members was 
one of discursive and performative perfection (speak/act like the military) and networking (into 
groupings of variable size and formality called gbôhi). The resulting mobility can best be 
described as „going in circles‟: circulation without penetration and apprenticeship without full 
mastery, impersonation without nomination. However, it is still early days to perceive what long-
term effects these „movements‟ will have, both on the life projects and aspirations of the 
youngsters in question and on the societal fields in which they have been deploying their truncated 
experiences and competencies. 
Although the present paper is based on approximately 110 formal and informal interviews with a 
total of 74 interlocutors during four spells of fieldwork between March 2008 and March 2010, its 
narrative gives ample attention to the lives of two special interlocutors: the late Ato Belly and 
„Marcus Garvey‟. During the post-electoral crisis of November 2010 to May 2011, I kept in touch 
with them (as well as with 17 others) mostly by telephone. This story begins with the last 
telephone conversation I had with Ato Belly to whom this paper is dedicated. 
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Final redress 
The last time I spoke to „General‟ Ato Belly was on Thursday 31st March 2011. It was the first 
night of the battle for Abidjan between armed forces defending the incumbent president Laurent 
Gbagbo and those dedicated to instate the elected president Alassane Ouattara.
4
 This battle 
heralded the tragic finale of the post-electoral crisis which took a decisive turn with the arrest of 
Laurent Gbagbo, ten days later. The pro-Ouattara offensive was carried both from the rebel-held 
northern territories by the recently erected Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI), and from 
within Abidjan by the so-called 'Invisible Commando' led by Major Coulibaly alias IB. This urban 
guerrilla group had been active in Abidjan for more than a month when at the end of March, in 
parallel with the final FRCI offensive on Abidjan, it began attacking strategic sites in the heart of 
the city: army camps and headquarters, the presidential palace and residence, and not in the least, 
the buildings of the national radio and television, RTI.
5
 In response, the pro-Gbagbo, so-called 
'patriotic' armed forces stepped up their mobilisation efforts by recruiting youngsters and/or 
handing out arms (mainly Kalashnikovs) to them. 
At about midnight of that Thursday 31st, Ato Belly was defending the RTI against the Invisible 
Commando when the deafening noise of detonations forced us to break off our (last) telephone 
conversation. Previously Ato had expressed his dismay about the speed of the FRCI blitz and 
(related to that) the laxity of the regular armed forces – called the Defence and Security Forces 
(FDS) – and the speed with which the majority had abandoned their positions. Forestalling an 
imminent military debacle for the pro-Gbagbo camp, Ato Belly joined (or, one can say, rejoined) 
the patriotic battle and took up the arms which he had officially put down back in May 2009. At 
that time, he was formally disarmed as a member, with the rank of 'general', of Abidjan's largest 
militia, the Grouping of Patriots for Peace (GPP, Groupement des Patriotes pour la Paix). Earlier 
that month patriotic youth leader Charles Blé Goudé urged youngsters to sign up for immediate 
recruitment into the army, Ato had declined. Nonetheless, he told me how he found pride in 
assisting in the enrolment of many members of his gbôhi (see also: Banégas, 2011). The latter is 
the Nouchi term for gang or group and, as we will see soon, it can refer to different types of 
networks, bands, and factions as well as formal militia groups. The junior militia members of 
Ato‟s gbôhi, he reported, were quartered at the prestigious infantry camp of Akouédo and he 
                                                 
4. Ato Belly died soon after. It appears that Ato was severely wounded during that night‟s battle and spent a couple of 
days in hospital before being discharged. Less than one week into his convalescence, Ato was shot dead in his house 
by people who have so far remained unidentified. 
5. The history of IB and his Invisible Commando remains to be elucidated. His role in the battle against Gbagbo is as 
murky as his participation in the coup d'état of 2002. On 27th April 2011 IB was killed and his Invisible Commando 
dismantled.  
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reckoned they were finally very close to becoming real soldiers: "they have a bed, a uniform, and 
a fire arm of their own". 
Ato Belly's reluctance to join the patriotic battle this time around was largely due to his resentment 
against the Gbagbo administration for lack of recognition and remuneration for his participation in 
the previous patriotic battles (following the coup d'état of 2002). Among other things, his long-
standing pro-Gbagbo militancy had materialised into the creation of GPP militia barracks in 
different parts of Abidjan in 2004 and 2007. Instead of official appreciation, Ato had seen both 
barracks being forcibly shut down by the FDS on direct orders from the president whose 
embattled nation he was trying to defend. On top of that, the 500,000 CFA (approximately 900 
Euro) demobilisation fee promised to every formally demobilised militia member, was never 
disbursed by the Gbagbo administration. This was all too grave for Ato who not only needed this 
money for his young family – living in a ramshackle house with a 10-month old disabled daughter 
– but also for the hundreds of youngsters of his gbôhi who kept on hassling him for financial 
support or urging him to raise the matter of this broken promise among the militia leadership and 
its patrons in presidential circles. But against all odds, Thursday 31st March offered the occasion 
for ultimate redress. 
During our last telephone conversation, Ato explained that he was rigged out in a complete battle 
dress, put together from among the uniforms, boots, berets, and belts, left behind by the many 
FDS who had abandoned the RTI premises. He had even succeeded, he added, in procuring a 
number of shoulder marks (galons) which he would sew on later. Also, he had an impressive 
amount of weapons at his disposal: Kalashnikovs in great numbers as well as anti-tank RPG-7 
grenade launchers. Finally, Ato did not miss the occasion to point out that all this took place in the 
presence, and with the support of Gbagbo's finest and manifestly bravest army unit, the 
Republican Guards (Gardes Républicaines). They made this sudden transformation 'real': 
vouching for his soldiery value, turning his hasty dressing-up into an official act of instantaneous 
conscription, and converting his seized weaponry and insignia into bestowals complementing his 
last-ditch, „well deserved‟ career move.  
Militias and pre-peace networking 
The above section recounts one of the many tragic micro-moments in Côte d'Ivoire's recent post-
electoral drama which formed the violent denouement of a long decennium of politico-military 
strife. The latter started with the 1999 coup d'état removing Henri Konan Bédié from power, 
followed by a turbulent military transition under General Guéï. Laurent Gbagbo's seizure of power 
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in late 2000 and the (half-successful) coup d'état which ensued from this in September 2002, 
resulted in the creation of a rebel-held northern zone. The recent post-electoral crisis set off when 
Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara both claimed victory in the November 2010 presidential 
elections. After four months of fruitless mediation the crisis took a decisive turn when the two 
protagonists chose recourse to military force and Ouattara won largely due to the support of the 
international community. 
The types of armed forces engaged in the conflict since 1999 were many and diverse. Apart from 
the regular military and security forces (FDS, and later, the FRCI), and the international peace-
keeping forces – the UN peace-keeping force ONUCI and its French counterpart „Operation 
Licorne‟ – there were  mercenaries, (gangs of) thugs, youth militias, hunter-warriors groups (the 
so-called dozos), ad hoc armed youth groups, and activist civilians providing shelter and food for 
the various combatants.  
Although estimates vary widely and (will) remain extremely difficult to make, one may count up 
to 40,000 people, mainly youngsters, who were active in so-called parallel forces on both sides of 
the conflict. An estimated 25,000 of them belonged to the pro-Gbagbo patriotic militias. The latter 
emerged in late 2002-early 2003 within widely differing contexts of local and national 
mobilisation. Although the large majority of the militia members waited for their official 
demobilisation and disarmament until the end of 2009, many were only active in military 
operations prior to 2005 and only for a couple of months in total.  
With a few notable exceptions, the operations in which the patriotic self-defence groups 
participated were of limited military significance. Ironic perhaps but quite typical for the Ivorian 
situation, militia organisations were mostly established in the aftermath of the early decisive 
combats in the west (Chelpi-den Hamer, 2010, 2011), and in anticipation of post-war registration 
and so-called communal reinsertion programmes, which began to materialise in a haphazard way 
from 2009 onwards. Throughout this period many remained mobilised or kept in contact with their 
units and commanders while attending to other activities. As we will see in more detail below, 
throughout the short decade of political-military conflict (2002-2011), the patriotic militias were 
the locus of extensive networking and to the extent that this was informed by political or 
ideological choices, became vast enterprises of civil society building. On the latter dimension of 
militia-formation I have written elsewhere (Arnaut, 2008b, 2008c). In this paper, I focus more on 
its social dimension: the intricate processes of networking.  After all, the post-war, or rather, pre-
peace multiplication of militias and their growing impact on social and political life, was a 
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protracted, multifaceted and multi-sited process, which this paper tries to begin to disentangle in 
terms of social mobility of a juvenile and subaltern kind. 
Military triangulations 
The dynamics of expansion, dissemination, and mobility of militias in southern Côte d'Ivoire 
during the preceding decade had at least three dimensions to it: (a) the flexibility of militia 
members as related to their resourcefulness and entrepreneurship, (b) the changeability of militia 
structures within strategies of clientelism and low-key elite formation, and (c) proximity to  
regular defence and security forces. The latter are commonly referred to as le(s) corps habillé(s), 
meaning 'corps in uniform' (literally, 'the dressed-up corps') and comprises several categories of 
uniform-wearing, arms-carrying civil servants: police, state police (gendarmes), specialised police 
units (such as environmental police), army, and customs (douanes). By 'proximity' to the corps 
habillés, I mean either the latter's  physical co-presence during training, on the front lines, and in 
various sites and schemes of 'violent labour', or their omnipresence in the aspirations of the 
youngsters – as holders of a secure employment and as icons of social success. As we will see at 
the end of this paper, this proximity situates the corps habillés and the militias in a common 'field'.  
Theorising this will allow us to get a firmer grip on youth, their social mobility and networking as 
dimensions of subaltern agency in times of crisis and violent conflict. But first, we need to grasp 
the basic entangled dynamic of militia members, their chiefs and patrons. 
Coming back to the issue of militia mobility, „General‟ Ato Belly was definitely a stationary type, 
both geographically and in terms of militia membership, but that did not make his calculations 
about his own and his fellow militiamen's social mobility any less judicious. Ato was an 
Abidjanese local taxi (woroworo) driver until late 2002, when he joined the patriotic movement. 
In early 2003 he joined the Abidjan-based GPP militia and remained active in its networks until 
his death. Within the GPP Ato played a central role in successive attempts to establish camps 
(cantonnement) in Abidjan. He took the lead in transforming the girls' school Institut Marie-
Thérèse into a GPP barracks. Between August  2004 and March 2005 this camp, branded as the 
First Battalion of Commando Legionnaires (1
èr
BCL), housed up to four hundred youngsters. 
Much later, in mid-2007, Ato made another successful attempt to accommodate several hundred 
militiamen who were out on the streets of Abidjan after having been chased from their camps and 
from the police and gendarme barracks in which they had been housed for several months. This 
time around, Ato chose the deserted run-down hotel Akwaba along the Abidjan beach as his self-
styled „naval‟ base – located in Vridi, the neighbourhood where Ato was raised and spent most of 
his life. According to Ato, his sustained attempts to muster and accommodate his ex-combatants 
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were meant to keep up the latter's public visibility in anticipation of announced demobilisation and 
reinsertion schemes. However, as we will see presently, given the inveterate uncertainty of these 
programmes, militiamen also bet on other horses. 
Both from the Akwaba „naval‟ base (until it was dismantled in November 2008) and, even more 
so, from the above-mentioned First BCL camp in Adjamé, Ato observed and supported the to and 
fro movements of 'his' troops. On an individual basis or in groups of variable size (also called 
gbôhi) combatants were seizing all sorts of opportunities to valorise their 'violent labour' 
(Hoffman, 2011) or other skills. In between answering one or the other call for support on the 
front lines, they carried out often very short-term contract work in as diverse areas as construction 
work and development projects, but mostly in security and vigilantism in very different sectors 
such as transport (or transport regulation) and politics.  
While serving as a dispatching centre for thousands of militia members in different war sites in the 
interior, the GPP in Abidjan increasingly fragmented. Whilst in action along the so-called front 
lines, GPP members formed new groups and networks which, on return in Abidjan, did not (fully) 
reintegrate into the parent organisation. These new networks, referred to as gbôhi, sometimes took 
the form of new militia factions with new leaders who autonomously proclaimed themselves 
'general' or 'commander'. Such was the case of the CNLB of Watchard Kédjébo, the FLP of 
Oliverson le Zoulou, and the GCLCI of Jimmy Willy, to name a few.
6
 The clearing of their only 
centralising camp at the Institut Marie-Thérèse and the relative failure of subsequent camps such 
as the one at Azito (Yopougon) and Biabou II (Abobo), as well as the aforementioned camp at 
Vridi (Port-Bouët), reinforced this process of disintegration which, in turn, was countered by 
subsequent attempts to regroup the militia factions. These federalising attempts were either 
undertaken by long-standing GPP leaders  such as President Bouazo Yoko Yoko Bernard or 'Chief 
of the Defence Staff' Jeff Fada, or by newcomers with relevant resources in the form of political 
contacts and financial means. Such was the case of 'General' Jimmy Willy who capitalised on his 
contacts with Gbagbo's FPI party in order to create the very influential federation Union des 
Mouvements d’Autodéfense du Sud (Union of Self-defence groups from the South, (UMAS)).7  
From the above description one can already  infer that the fragmentation of militias was not only 
the outcome of grassroots militia mobility and networking but also of intervention 'from above', in 
casu, of sustained attempts by political and military entrepreneurs to raise militias or federations 
thereof and become officially recognised as their chiefs. The general dynamics of the Ivorian 
                                                 
6. CNLB = Comité National pour la Libération de Bouaké ; FLP = Front pour la Libération du Peuple;  GCLCI = 
Groupement des Combattants pour la Libération de la Côte d'Ivoire. 
7. UMAS = L'Union des mouvements d'autodéfense du sud.  
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patriotic activism in general  and militancy in particular, is one of mobility, of fission and fusion. 
These processes started within days of the outbreak of the conflict in September 2002 and, as far 
as we can discern, are still going on in the post-conflict period with militia leaders repositioning 
themselves and building new constituencies in the peace process. If Eugène Djué is now (May 
2011) a figure-head of the reconciliation of patriotic militias with the new Ouattara regime, it is 
mainly due to his more or less consolidated status as a Big Man  of patriotic militantism: in order 
to mark his senior position as a militia paramount chief among the many militia „generals‟, he 
labelled himself „marshal‟ (Arnaut, 2006).8 
Further to this point, it is significant that the GPP, the self-declared „mother of all patriotic 
militias‟, is itself the offshoot of an earlier patriotic organisation, the UPLTCI (l’Union des 
Patriotes pour la Libération Totale de la Côte d’Ivoire) created by Eugène Djué in the immediate 
aftermath of the September 2002 insurgency. Almost at the same time, Djué's fellow former 
student leader and competitor in patriotic activism, Charles Blé Goudé, created the eventually 
hegemonic patriotic federation, the Alliance des Jeunes Patriotes pour le sursaut national. When, 
after a couple of months, Charles Groguhet and Touré Moussa Zéguen left Djué's activist UPLTCI 
and founded their own, more belligerent and instantly very popular, GPP militia, both Goudé and 
Djué recouped some of the GPP's trained combatants, while at the same time tried to incorporate 
the GPP and other organisations into their respective patriotic federations. The same double 
operation of patronage underlies the overall dynamics of the patriotic militias: (a) emerging 
patrons trying to draw together networks of adventurous and peripatetic juvenile militants (from 
below) while (b) capturing through federation (from above) the networks that escape their control. 
In order to illustrate how the above processes were also at work in other militias, but above all, in 
order to introduce the aspect of the proximity of corps habillés as the third factor of militia 
dynamics, I introduce another character, a militia member called 'Marcus Garvey'. His case in 
combination with that of Ato Belly provides the core empirical ground for further theorising  
subaltern mobility and networking in conflict situations. 
‘Marcus Garvey’, networker and ‘Nouchi’ 
Like Ato Belly, 'Marcus Garvey' took up arms again in the tragic finale of post-electoral conflict, . 
Also like Ato Belly, „Marcus Garvey‟ saw himself very much as part of the so-called reserve pool 
or support base (base arrière) of the FDS, not by dispatching 'violent labour' or by 
accommodating its 'labourers' in barracks (as Ato Belly did) but by executing such violent labour 
                                                 
8. A reworked version of this paper will appear in Utas (2012) and expands on the phenomenon of „bigmanity‟ in the 
networking and performance of militia members in Cote d‟Ivoire. 
11 
 
first as a combatant and later as the foreman (chef de dispositif) of a group engaged in security 
operations. In sum, both Ato and „Garvey‟ – hereafter without quotes – were Big Men of sorts, 
managing a network (gbôhi) of (ex-)combatants around them. Of both their networks nothing 
much is presently left: Ato's gbôhi has lost its leader (and in all probability most of its members), 
while Garvey's is entirely dispersed and reduced to a dozen friends trying to keep in touch by 
mobile phone.  
In March 2003, at the age of 28, Garvey left Abidjan where he was born and raised, in order to 
join the western front near Guiglo. After a stay of about eight months during which he was 
enrolled by the FLGO militia, Garvey was flown home in the company of exactly 677 Abidjan-
based FLGO recruits. Following a short stay at-cum-forced-removal from the Akouédo army 
camp, half of the returnees, including Garvey, took up residence in the vicinity of the camp, in the 
unfinished houses of a gigantic building site on the outskirts of Abidjan called Lauriers. Later on, 
for about seven months (November 2004-May 2005) Garvey ran a large-scale vigilante operation 
around the radio and TV transmitting station of Abobo (northern Abidjan) in collaboration with 
the FDS. For this, he estimates that he employed more than 200 (ex-)combatants, most of whom 
belonged to his already unravelling gbôhi at Lauriers. One year later, Garvey returned to Guiglo 
where he associated himself with the MILOCI militia who, in the meantime, had won a certain 
notoriety and was first in line for receiving demobilisation fees. In late 2008, after more than two 
years in Guiglo waiting fruitlessly to be demobilised, Garvey returned to Abidjan and joined what 
was left of his gbôhi at Lauriers. As before (2003-2004, between moving into Lauriers and taking 
on the vigilantes  operation at Abobo), he and his dispirited gang survived on small jobs mostly in 
building, security, or petty trade until the violent denouement of the post-electoral crisis made him 
and the remaining 60 members of his group take up arms again.  
On 3rd March 2011 Garvey got hold of an AK-47 rifle from one of the many deserting trainees at 
the Gendarmerie School and integrated into the armed forces that were defending the residence of 
the incumbent president Gbagbo at Cocody. When one week later, heavy UN and French 
bombardments destroyed the entire defence infrastructure around the presidential residence, and 
the arrest of Gbagbo was imminent, Garvey abandoned the battle. He also walked out on what was 
left of his gbôhi most of whom had decided to continue the struggle from the marine base at 
Yopougon, seconding the notoriously intrepid marine forces loyal to Gbagbo. Two months after 
this naval base was 'pacified' by national and international forces in May 2011, only two of 
Garvey's gbôhi have returned home. As before, Garvey now (May 2011) shares a squatted storage 
container with his old mate Aubin (who was too ill to partake in the recent fighting). Garvey's 
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girlfriend who takes care of their three-year old daughter has so far refused to join her partner in 
this make-shift abode.  
Having no proper job, no proper house, and no family in whose midst he resides, Garvey labels 
himself a 'Noussi'. Going against the standard spelling of 'Nouchi' which refers to a broad category 
of (juvenile) urban vagrants and their slang (Newell, 2009a, de Latour, 2001), Garvey employs an 
idiosyncratic etymology to stress the word's composition of the French morphemes: 'nous' (we) 
and „si‟ (if), while explaining that: 
"We the unemployed, we the students who have diplomas but no jobs, we, children whom 
the street has given birth to without checking into the maternity hospital, it is us; if you 
could accept us in your society without too many arrière-pensées [reservations] about us".  
This passage in which Garvey tries to grasp the predicament of his exclusion from mainstream 
society, is an excerpt from one of his many writings which total about 350 pages of manuscript 
describing his life during the 2002-2011 violent conflict. His story as well as that of Ato (which is 
enshrined in about eight hours of recorded interviews), form the core of the empirical basis for 
exploring what I have called the proximity of the corps habillés as a first step towards addressing 
the central questions of subaltern mobility and networking in times of conflict.  
Corps habillé 
The relationship between the youth militias and the corps habillés during the 2002-2011 conflict 
in Côte d'Ivoire entails (a) the latter's physical co-presence during training, on the front lines, and 
in various other sites and schemes of 'violent labour', and (b) their importance in the youngster‟s 
imagination as icons of successful people with a (potentially) honourable profession, a secure 
employment, and a flourishing social life. This does not mean that youth militia members have an 
unqualified admiration for the corps habillés. Rather, the relationship between militia members 
and their professional counterparts is riddled with ambiguity. 
Reading through the writings of „Marcus Garvey‟, it is difficult to miss the fact that, similar to 
many of his fellow combatants, the proximity to the army is the alpha and omega of his 
engagement with militias. In the first pages of his war journal, „Garvey‟ reports a short 
conversation with a friend which instantly made him volunteer for the patriotic battle. When 
informing his friend „Garvey‟ that an organisation was being set up in order to dispatch youngsters 
to the front lines, he explained its modus operandi as follows: 
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"You go, they train you, they drop you off on the battle front in order to fight alongside the 
FANCI (Ivorian regular army) and after the war, they put you in the army, at least those 
who survived." (Garvey, 2011: 7) 
The plausibility of this causal link between militia membership and entry into the regular army, 
largely followed from the appeals of popular politicians in the early months after the insurgency of 
2002, calling on youngsters to join the regular army which was diagnosed as ageing, depleted, 
disheartened and in urgent need of reinforcement. Officially in late 2002 about 3000 of those who 
volunteered were incorporated into the army while thousands of rejected youngsters kept roaming 
the streets and public places of Abidjan for several months hoping fruitlessly to become part of 
future recruitment campaigns. That is where the process of militia formation took off.  
Once they were incorporated in one or the other self-defence group based either in Abidjan or on 
the front lines in central and western Côte d'Ivoire, these volunteers immediately came into direct 
contact with members or former members (either retired or dismissed) of the corps habillés. 
Among the earliest recruits of the GPP were a group of 65 marines who had recently been 
dismissed for insubordination (Njabehi 18/6/2008; Shao 4/4/2009).
9
 Rather than becoming plain 
militia combatants, most (ex-) members of the FDS took up more responsible positions and acted 
as trainers and coaches, exceptionally as militia leaders and in a few cases also as gatekeepers. In 
all, members of the corps habillés occupied vital positions in the intricate patronage structure 
surrounding the militias. 
With few notable exceptions such as that of 'Commander' Nahui Lazare, leader of the self-defence 
group MI-24, who was an ex-member of the Ivorian army (Nahui 26/03/2009), (former) soldiers 
and policemen acted most often as coaches and trainers of the militia groups. To start with the 
former category, the late Koré Moïse alias 'Ministre de la Défense', was a military officer 
effectively dispatched from the Ministry of Defence, who acted as a coach to the GPP leadership 
during the first years of the conflict (2002-2005) (Ato 25/3/2009; Saintgbal 21/3/2008; Delta & 
Assoumou 3/4/2009). A typical example of a trainer is 'Colonel' Zagbayou who was a sergeant of 
the Ivorian army. In Abidjan he was one of the GPP's most important trainers since the very early 
days (Lago 8/4/2009; Njabehi 18/6/2008). Zagbayou continued his training sessions of militia 
volunteers in Yopougon into the post-electoral crisis, and even ended up fighting alongside his 
trainees until the final days of patriotic resistance to Ouattara's election (Le Patriote 11/1/2011; 
Times Live 30/04/2011). On the western front sergeants like Koulaï Roger and Oulaï Delafosse 
played a similar role. Unlike Zagbayou who appeared to have had good connections with the 
                                                 
9. The standard format for referring to formal field interviews is: (Name d/m/yyyy).  
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presidency, Koulaï and Delafosse were dispatched by their respective superiors, Colonel Oulé 
Yedess and General Denis Bombet, to train and coach the FLGO recruits. Importantly, higher 
officers such as Yedess and Bombet were less patrons than gatekeepers. As prominent members of 
the armed forces they legitimised the temporary permeability of the military sector for enterprising 
and zealous youngsters. In this role the military gatekeepers were endorsed by high-profile 
politicians cum agitators such as presidential security councillor Kadet Bertin and patriotic youth 
leader Charles Blé Goudé who regularly proclaimed the state's receptivity to juvenile input for its 
corps habillés. In fact, Bertin's and Blé Goudé's rapid rise to national prominence in itself indexed 
the new possibilities for youngsters. In addition to the politicians who made public appeals, there 
were those whose occasional public encouragement of youthful patriotic activism was 
complemented by moral, material, and financial support for certain militias. Among these 
sponsors featured members of parliament of Gbagbo's FPI party such as Nko Marcel and William 
Attéby, and fellow party member Geneviève Bro Grébé, president of the patriotic women's 
organisation (Ato 26-2-2010, Bouazo 19-03-2008). Together, military gatekeepers as much as 
politicians and propagandists who either represented or supported the militant youngsters, 
inscribed the militias into the larger story of the emergent 'rejuvenation of the nation' under 
president Gbagbo by showing them concrete pathways leading from militias into the military and 
by extension the corps habillés  (see: Arnaut, 2005). 
More concretely, it is no exaggeration to say that all ex-combatants of the self-defence groups I 
have spoken to could name at least one member of the corps habillés who was involved in their 
training or an important military operation in which they participated (such as Dignité or 
Léopard). Moreover, many of the militia members spent some time in one or the other military 
precincts on the front lines or in Abidjan. In and around Abidjan the prestigious marine base of 
Adiaké and the spacious 1st Battalion camp at Akouédo were important sites in that respect and so 
were the two so-called war schools of Abidjan: Ecole de Police and Ecole de Gendarmerie (e.g. 
Guéï & KRR & Ato 10/04/2009). In all of these places militia members received extremely 
variable treatment – a puzzling alternation of being glorified and humiliated. They were nurtured 
and accommodated at one moment and starved and chased at gunpoint at the next. As we will see 
presently, a similar ambivalence was equally at play in the core signifier of the corps habillés: the 
dress which could connote dignity and righteousness as much as cowardice and travesty. 
One of the central items of proximity between the corps habillés and patriotic militias was the 
outfit. Issues and anecdotes relating to the uniform or battle dress (treillis), including the shoulder 
marks (galons), the beret (beret), boots (rangers or rénaux), and the belt (ceinturon), crop up in 
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almost any conversation with ex-combatants. This is also the case in Garvey's autobiography. 
Merely four months after his arrival on the western front line, he reports that militia members of 
Guiglo went out demonstrating half naked in military drill (pas-gym) while chanting "Give us 
uniforms".
10
 This incident was as much revelatory as foreboding. It heralded ever growing 
tensions between the militia rank and file on the one hand and its leadership and the corps habillés 
units at Guiglo on the other. Eventually, this resulted in the deportation of more than 600 FLGO 
youngsters to Abidjan in early October 2003, as discussed earlier. Also, as I explain below, this 
event exemplarily revealed the broader meaning of 'dressing-up' in the context of the Ivoirian 
conflict and the participation of militant youngsters in it. 
To "dress up the militia members" (habiller les éléments) does not simply mean provide them with 
uniforms or authorising wearing them, but falls nothing short of securing official employment 
including registration, monthly salary, health care and pension schemes, etc. That is what sergeant 
Roger Koulaï, the FLGO's main trainer and Yedess's aide de camp, referred to when in response to 
the nude pas-gym he promised his trainees would all 'be dressed'; yet several months later, just 
days before their deportation to Abidjan, he broke down in tears, admitting: "I have lied to you, 
you will not be dressed here" (Garvey, 2011: 21). This strongly indicates that the militia's focus on 
uniforms is much more than a (juvenile) obsession with outward appearance. As we will see 
presently, apart from considering the uniform as indexing a potentially critical move qua social 
mobility, for its aficionados it also functioned as a marker of moral distinction. 
As could be expected, the military leadership gave preference to its regular troops when it came to 
the distribution of battle dresses and equipment. Garvey reports on the frustration this sometimes 
caused among his fellow FLGO members but while explaining this he also provides us with some 
clues as to how this combines with a more general disdain about the FDS's (in)significance in 
maintaining public order in a front-line city like Guiglo. During the rainy season of 2003, he 
writes, "The policeman at his roadblock could sleep throughout, the gendarme commuted between 
the Mini Shop bar and his desk, while the soldier was busy managing his women's business when 
he wasn't attending to the roadblock." In order to measure the degree of Garvey's low esteem for 
all three categories of the corps habillés, it is important to know that not only drinking at the Mini 
Shop and flirting was considered to be of little profit for national security, but also hanging around 
the office, and even more so, occupying a roadblock was despised as a futile war-time activity. 
                                                 
10. The full song is "Donnez treillis oooh ça va finir (2x)” (Give us uniforms" oh it will finish), adding “han got the 
natty dread”. The word 'dread' is an interesting contamination of dress (the expression 'natty dress') and dreadlock 
which together with the rest of the English 'got the' indicates the presence of Liberian fellow combatants (mercenaries 
as well as members of the LIMA militia) on the western front. Garvey could not explain the meaning of the word 
„han‟.  
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This is also explained by Ato Belly (25/3/2009) who, in a long narrative about the day he decided 
to abandon his job as a taxi driver in order to "liberate his country", he insulted the policemen who 
approached him at the central junction (le grand carrefour) of Abidjan's important commune of 
Koumassi: "I told them: this country is dying and you are here busy racketeering along the road; 
one asks us to go and liberate Bouaké, you have the required arms but you use them to force taxis 
to stop". The fact that, as a taxi driver, Ato had been undergoing the racketeering-at-gunpoint of 
these police officers for many years, certainly added to his frustration and to the ferocity of his 
scolding. However, it is probably not so much the practice of roadside racketeering itself which 
Ato took offence at – after all that was also one of the militias' favourite activities –, but the fact 
that the corps habillés' arrogance towards helpless citizens masked a proven lack of courage when 
it came to facing an armed adversary. This also was exemplified in the way the FDS dealt with 
their uniforms. 
The most obvious sign of the cowardice among the FDS was what „General‟ Ato Belly witnessed 
in 2002/2003 as much as in 2011: imminent attacks by rebel forces were preceded by massive 
desertions. As Ato experienced on 31st March 2011, at the national radio and television site these 
deserters set off with a hasty change of clothes. In 2003 Richard & Eric (10/04/2009), two 
members of Ato Belly's gbôhi, identified this to be the reason for their own recruitment into a 
special commando for attacking a rebel stronghold near Daloa: the FDS who were stationed there 
"had taken fright, they undressed [...] they took their rifles and threw them away, they put on 
civilian clothes and fled". In recompense, 35 GPP members such as themselves and 15 
professional commando troops from Akouédo, formed a new commando which received the same 
red (marines) berets, the same uniform and the same weapons – for Richard and Eric a source of 
profound job satisfaction.  
Finally, uniforms were not only a way of distinguishing oneself from the non-uniformed civil 
servants  and civilians, but also from different armed units, and most of all, from enemy troops. 
Recounting his admission to the GPP, Ato explains that he feared confusion and infiltration when 
he observed that GPP militia members were dressed in the same way as the rebels he had seen on 
TV: wearing no proper boots (rangers) but plastic sandals (lèke), and merely uniform trousers and 
a T-shirt  (bas treillis)" (Ato Belly 07/06/2008).
11
 As the late GPP 'General' Shango (14/06/2008) 
explains, dressing up like the rebels was sometimes part of the tactics used mainly on the western 
front (see Utas and Jörgel, 2008 for parallels). In other circumstances, wearing the full uniform 
                                                 
11. Having observed this confusion, Ato Belly proposed to the militia leadership to create and supervise a GPP 
intelligence service. 
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was indispensable and an important part of the military etiquette. During the military crisis of 
November 2004, Ato Belly (26/02/2010) explains, his troops started seconding the elite 
Republican Guards in their task of defending the presidential residence. The way Ato recounts it, 
the trustworthiness and the dedication of both groups as expressed in their sharing a full dress 
(treillis complet) warranted the fraternal co-presence of both formal and informal armed forces.  
This brings us to the 'social' dimension of the relationship between both groups. 
Militia members generally refer to the corps habillés as their 'elder brothers' (grand frères). This 
relationship carries the full ambiguity of their rapport: it combines familiarity with respect and, at 
times, resentment, which in practice underlies their mutual complicity as much as inequality and 
the militia's subjugation. The deep sense of complicity transpires well, for instance, from a whole 
series of mutual engagements with the FDS which, for instance, Garvey reports in his writings. 
One typical example relates to the arrangements about the road blocks or checkpoints (corridors) 
and patrols (patrouilles) which Garvey and his gbôhi set up in the vicinity of the transmitting 
station of Abobo during the time they were responsible for its protection. At four so-called 
passage ways (corridors) members of Garvey's group undertook the rather lucrative activity of 
checking the identity papers and luggage of passers-by and accepting bribes from them. By doing 
this they entered into direct competition with the surrounding corps habillés who were readily cut 
in on the deal. "The elder brothers agreed", Garvey (2011: 90) notes with satisfaction.  
At certain dramatic moments this complicity between militias and the military was reversed by the 
latter who used their power and position to discipline or punish their 'younger brothers'. In late 
2006 and early 2007 more than 300 GPP youngsters experienced this during their time at the 
aforementioned Abidjanese war schools. While initially the militias were well received there, the 
relationship rapidly deteriorated in the run-up to the March 2007 Ouagadougou peace accord, and 
resulted in the militia members being chased at gunpoint from their guest abode. However 
humiliating such forced evacuations and other reprimands were, they were sometimes glossed 
over as the legitimate right of 'elder brothers' to correct or admonish their younger siblings (Delta 
& Assouma 3-4-2009). Finally, such reprimands were all the more humiliating when they 
involved uniforms. When in November 2008 Ato Belly's so-called naval base at Vridi was 
evacuated by the chief of staff, General Philippe Mangou, himself, the sad climax was that all 
uniforms, boots and military gear were piled up and set fire to in the presence of television 
cameras (Ato Belly 25/03/2009). In spite of deeply traumatic events such as these and other camp 
evacuations, many militia members persevered in the desire to and  hope of joining the military 
one day. Such tenacity requires our theoretical attention. 
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Subaltern mobility: going in circles? 
The above detailed description of the complex and ambivalent relationship between the military 
and the militias through the prism of corps habillés, allows us to safely speculate that for militia 
members FDS uniforms and military gear were important markers of a prospective transition 
process which could lead into the heart of the corps habillés. Such a process starts, quite plainly, 
with a change of clothes, as described in graphic terms by the late GPP 'commander' Roger 
Njabehi (26/03/2009):  
"because we were civilians, we had to put on a military uniform [...] in order to help the 
military [...] and the military were aware of that, and the gendarmes were also aware of 
that: that these kids there are helping us; so we are going to fight along with you, „dress 
them‟, and they have dressed us".  
However, as we know now, with the exception of a few lucky ones, thousands have seen their 
military dreams unfulfilled until this day (Banégas, 2008).  
The magnitude of this disillusion is certainly proportional to the recursivity of the false promises 
expressed by many important political and military entrepreneurs, and at critical moments, echoed 
by the militia leaders themselves in a desperate attempt to keep their gbôhi mobilised and rallied 
behind them. However, the impact of these messages 'from above' must be completed by 
considering the tactics 'from below', for instance the sustained attempts by youngsters to insinuate 
themselves into the corps habillés in spite of the successive disillusions and even downright 
rejections over a period of many years. For many of the militia members, like for Ato Belly and 
Marcus Garvey, these disillusions repeated themselves over a period of eight long years and ended 
sometime in March 2011, in a decisive if not fatal bid to enter the corps habillés. By then the latter 
were perceived as stripped of the weak, the cowards and the imposters who, in an ultimate 
démasqué, had abandoned their battle dresses. The militia members' sticking to the uniforms in 
itself became a demonstration of their unabated loyalty and  proof that they deserved what they 
had been asking for since day one: 'being dressed'. 
In the remainder of this paper, I want to further explore the effects and, above all, the mechanisms 
of these tactics of impersonation within broader frames of apprenticeship, on-the-job training, and 
social mobility. As a starting point, it is important to be aware that the youngsters were somehow 
conscious of the fact that by putting on some military garb and hanging about in the vicinity of the 
corps habillés, they were playing a big game with all the ambiguity that came with it. Near the end 
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of 2007, after yet another six months of waiting for the demobilisation and reintegration 
programme in Guiglo to resume, Garvey noted: 
"I am 32 years old, it is true that without having served in the army, I have served in the 
army. I have frequented it so much that I can claim I was with it, this army, it is beautiful, 
impressive but hypocrite and treacherous. When I recall the words of Sergeant Koulaï 
Roger I feel myself suffering, regretting. I still see him sobbing, telling us that he merely 
executed orders. That makes me feel like throwing up: to offer hopes of beauty and of 
strength, and shatter these in such a hypocritical way. In one word, I have walked 
alongside this beauty, this imposing and betraying hypocrite and I have come to detest it in 
the end." (Garvey, 2011) 
The central metaphor of this paragraph – companionship – provides some guidance for starting to 
devise an analytical framework for subaltern (social) mobility in-times-of-crisis. Garvey looks 
back on a trajectory in which he got entangled with the army, learned much about it, learned much 
of it, but never really became part of it, never fully inhabited the corps he so eagerly wanted to 
belong to. Instead, in phrases such as "I was with it" (my emphasis) Garvey positions himself as a 
(travel) companion of the army. This matches the general theme of his autobiography which he 
entitles 'The companion' and in which he addresses the reader throughout as 'my companion'. 
Companionship has at least two strings of meanings which relate to social mobility and 
networking respectively. In the realm of social mobility, the companionship implies an enduring 
situation of initiation or apprenticeship without ever reaching full proficiency. Garvey sees 
himself lingering in a situation of truncated mastery which for some time constitutes a source of 
hope but eventually also of desperation. Equally so in the realm of networking, the enduring co-
travelling produces 'company' in many forms albeit mainly of a rather ephemeral and cursory 
nature. The fellow companions of the army and corps habillés in their capacity as elder brothers 
have a large stake in regulating the see-saw movement of nearing (complicity) and distancing 
(subjugation) between the militia dilettantes and the properly 'dressed' FDS professionals. 
Furthermore, militia members seek the company of friends or 'compagnons de route' and more 
often than not consider themselves belonging to a gbôhi. Although at certain times the gbôhi can 
be a strong locus of identification and solidarity, it has very permeable boundaries and is in 
constant flux as people join and leave. Finally, militia activity creates conduits to the bigger world 
of national politics, magistrature, and top-level administration. The web of military and political 
patronage surrounding the self-defence groups in Côte d'Ivoire of the preceding decade resulted 
both in occasional contacts and short or long-term contracts between members of both realms. 
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Having addressed Gbagbo directly in the course of a protest action was a source of pride for 
Marcus Garvey, as much as it was a source of prestige for Ato Belly to have met the army chief of 
staff Philippe Mangou on several occasions. More durable and lucrative were the special 
operations or long-term bodyguard contracts for politicians, judges, or top-level civil servants, 
which certain militia members were able to secure for themselves and their gbôhi. A good 
example of this was the two-month contract Ato Belly concluded with the Mauritanian 
ambassador in February 2011 in order for him and a dozen of his 'elements' to protect the embassy 
and the hundreds of Mauritanian refugees it accommodated at that time.  
In all, the networking as much as the on-the-job training of militia apprenticeship, were rather 
shallow and elusive, and, for the large majority of the militia members, never resulted in full 
mastery, a stable professional or patronage network, or a far-reaching identification with the 
coveted corps habillés. Instead, the relationship with the latter largely boiled down to a fascination 
for what Garvey calls its "beauty and strength", that is, its outward appearance epitomised by the 
uniforms and paraphernalia, and its strength indexed by the fire arms and the direct impact of 
carrying weapons in public. Thus, in spite of their tenacity and dedication, militia members 
remained forever „outside‟ and hierarchically 'below' the army „corps‟ – enduringly peripheral and 
subaltern. Any further theorising should start from here. 
Incrementalism, impersonation, and the field 
Tens of thousands of youngsters who try to supplement the state's corps habillés, can be taken as 
an instance of what AbdouMaliq Simone describes as 'incrementalism' (Simone, 2008a: 17). In his 
usage, this refers to the gradual albeit sometimes rapid process of appendage in the construction of 
houses, markets and other urban infrastructures . When applied to institutional contexts such as the 
corps habillés, incrementalism alerts us the proliferation of “state”; what Aretxaga (2003: 369) 
identifies as "an excess of statehood practices: too many actors competing to perform as state". 
This enables me to further develop the idea developed elsewhere (Arnaut and Højbjerg, 2008, 
Hagmann and Péclard, 2010, Menkhaus, 2008) that the absence of the state in Africa leaves voids 
that are filled in by entrepreneurs of different sorts. 'Incrementalism' does not start from possible 
voids but from the supplementing or multiplying operations in the vicinity of state institutions 
which may either condense and extend them or rather drain and trim them down. As one of 
Hibou‟s seminal texts on state transformation – in accord with founding texts such as that of 
Bayart (Bayart et al., 1999) and Reno (1995) – points out, the privatisation of the state does not 
simply concern its 'décharge' (discharge) but also its 'dédoublement' (duplication/multiplication) 
by way of the "intensive use of intermediaries" (Hibou, 1999: 13-14). More recent studies in 
21 
 
domains as diverse as administration (Blundo, 2006) and conflict transformation (Menkhaus, 
2008, Mehler, 2009, Engel and Mehler, 2005) show the empirical potential of exploring this 
multiplication or refraction, resulting in the creation of vast terrains of hybrid state-related 
activity. These mediations take place within the networks described in the preceding sections of 
this paper and consist of gbôhi and militia structures with shifting degrees of formality as well as 
the patron networks that surround them. Central nodes in these hybrid, mediating structures are 
Big Men of different scale and weight who occupy equally ambivalent positions in transition 
zones between state and non-state activity. 
In order to understand such zones of state mediation it is important not only to acknowledge the 
pull factors of state „décharge‟: formal (say World Bank or Washington-consensus guided) as well 
as informal privatisation. The obvious „push factors‟ of state mediation are youth unemployment 
or, more generally, lack of opportunities. This situation has been rightly identified as “social 
death” (Vigh, 2006) or „blockage‟ – as a lack of mobility and opportunities “to keep the options 
open” (Simone, 2008b). The (auto)biographies of Ato Belly and Marcus Garvey offer us a certain 
insight into the tactics of setting out on a voyage that could open the possibility of entering the 
composite state institution of the corps habillés. The tactical movements of the militant youngsters 
take place in the vague terrain situated between a state-in-crisis which is outsourcing its military 
force and a vast group of youngsters engaged in what Mitchell (2007) perhaps would call a 
“counter-inscription of the state”. In sum, it seems proper to suggest that the main juvenile tactics, 
that of impersonation and dressing up, is above all an “art of being in between” (De Certeau, 
1984: 30). Like „la perruque‟ – De Certeau‟s locus classicus of the subaltern tactics of the detour: 
the diversion of labour time in government and commercial administrations as much as in 
factories – the militia activity of so many militant Ivorian youngsters during the past decade can 
best be understood as a sustained “act of camouflage, of counterfeit and  make believe”  aimed at 
insinuating themselves into the state and its institutions.  
These provisional remarks on impersonation are meant to indicate that we are dealing with a 
particularly complex phenomenon which requires the kind of empirical and theoretical grounding 
which this paper is merely able to begin to provide. After all, we need to account for the reflexive 
dialectics involved in dressing up (from below) and being dressed up (from above), or more 
broadly, in the appropriation and registering of forms, types and postures which circulate within 
the urban, national and transnational Ivorian space – to the extent that, in themselves, these forms 
come to stand for circulation, (social) mobility and advancement in life. Any proper interpretation 
of impersonation as subaltern tactics, must avoid slipping into simplistic, supremacist, if not 
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downright (neo)colonialist conceptions of subaltern mimicry (Apter, 1999, and see Fabian, 2002, 
Ferguson, 2002).  
The broader empirical grounding for juvenile impersonation in patriotic militantism and activism 
in Côte d‟Ivoire, must be sought within popular culture and popular politics, which in the 
preceding decades had been vested in new a urban culture which has sometimes been labelled as 
„Nouchi‟ (see also: McGovern, 2011). To describe the successful career of Nouchi in Ivorian 
public life over the last two decades is beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to situate the 
expansion of Nouchi street culture in the period of fast urbanisation of the 1980s, and, most 
importantly, its take-up by the student „revolutionary‟ movements of the 1990s. This, in turn, led 
to the introduction of street culture and discourse into opposition politics, mainly in the hands of 
the leftist party FPI and its leader Laurent Gbagbo. And when the latter came to power in 2000, to 
its sedimentation in mainstream politics (Arnaut, 2008a, Arnaut, 2005). By and large, what many 
Ivoirians seem to observe in politics is comparable to what Newell (2009b) describes as „bluff‟ in 
economic and sexual exchange in Abidjanese urban street culture, and what before him Banégas 
and Warnier (2001: 8) identified as "mischievousness, astuteness, [and] the right of the strongest 
[...] in a moral economy of shrewdness and 'débrouille'". What makes the bluff particularly 
interesting is "the incorporation of deceitful illusion and illocutionary performance into economic 
transactions, gender roles, and claims to modernity" (Newell, 2009b: 384). Very important for our 
purposes is the fact that in typical bluff settings none of the participants are completely fooled, but 
at most embezzled:  
"It was at once based on the idea of deception and prestige of illusion, yet at the same time 
no one was fooled, the audience was aware of the hoax before the show even began. And 
yet, everyone acted as though the bluff were real."  
In conclusion, Newell (2009b: 385) claims: "the audience‟s awareness of fakery was irrelevant, it 
was the aptitude for artifice that earns respect and praise, and had transformative potential." 
The politician who embodied this 'aptitude for artifice' most cogently was President Gbagbo, the 
Biggest Man in the country at the time, in his capacity as 'the baker' (le boulanger) who, according 
to the French expression to which this epithet refers, "rolls everyone in flour" (il roule tout le 
monde dans la farine), that is, takes everyone (his colleagues, his opponents as much as his 
electorate) for a ride. However, if streetwise bluffing is a youth competency, so are its political 
and activist variants. One of the most flagrant instances of juvenile political „bluff‟ was the so-
called 'Versailles Accord' signed in July 2006 by „warring‟ youth leaders such as Charles Blé 
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Goudé and Karamoko Yayoro six months before the senior politicians signed a new peace 
agreement at Ouagadougou. Adding to the „artifice‟ was that „Versailles‟ in the aforementioned 
accord did not refer to the French town where the post-WWI peace agreement was signed, but to 
Café de Versailles, a bar-restaurant in a posh part of Abidjan owned by Ivoirian reggae superstar 
Alpha Blondy. The juvenile „Versailles Accord‟ had all the makings of a successful 'fakery': a 
peace accord named after a world historical event, discussed in a trendy Abidjanese pub by youth 
leaders who not only impersonated senior national and international negotiators and simulated its 
drafting and signing, but who also anticipated the latter and, thus, imposed themselves as political 
players to be reckoned with.  
The well-frequented popular parliaments were other examples of youthful political bluff involving 
a dozen or so junior political leaders. The flippant use of 'Versailles' resembled in this respect the 
use of 'La Sorbonne', the name of Abidjan‟s most notorious people‟s parliament. „La Sorbonne‟ 
was created in Abidjan's administrative centre (Le Plateau) in the 1980s as a place of, and served 
as a model for, hundreds of other popular parliaments set up since 2000 (Yao Gnabeli, 2005, Bahi, 
2003, Bahi, 2004: 59). Like the renowned Parisian university, to which they relate through the 
Abidjanese 'La Sorbonne', the many parliaments employed self-styled 'professors' who delivered 
'scientific' analyses, thus claiming some sort of 'open university' status for their political 
propaganda (Bahi, 2001: 159, Atchoua, 2008).  
A final example of juvenile activist 'bluffing' is that which took place on a grand scale in the urban 
militias and the southern youth militant groups in general. As we have seen, the simulations of 
„real‟ military life were manifold and pertained to matters of rank, outfit and attire, and, of course, 
activities. Among these the use of military titles by the GPP leadership was the most flagrant, 
since not only GPP members were meant to recognise them but also civilians and the FDS 
acknowledged them publicly, sometimes tongue-in-cheek and sometimes more seriously – 
depending on the power balance at the moment of interaction (Arnaut, 2006). 
Lastly, in a recent paper Newell (2009a) invites us to situate impersonation and „bluff‟ in the very 
heart of Nouchi culture. Bluffing, he argues, as the appropriation of alterity is also central to the 
urban slang called Nouchi. Taking most of its lexical material from French, Nouchi also 
incorporates lexical material from English and a number of national languages such as Dyula, 
Baule, and Bété. By dethroning „metropolitan‟ French and venturing into trans-local and 
transnational linguistic terrains, Nouchi indexes urban cosmopolitism and modernity (idem). But 
there is more to it. Nouchi is in constant flux and its speakers take pride in using the latest new 
words or even try to introduce them themselves by transferring lexical material from other 
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„languages‟ within their repertoires. This can be attested in Marcus Garvey‟s autobiography in 
which he enriches „standard‟ Nouchi with expressions which he himself identifies as “military 
slang” or “builder‟s idiom”. Taken together, his repertoires index his „walks of life‟: the different 
sectors of society and professional activities which he straddles. In other words, his linguistic 
agility is a function of his (professional) flexibility, and, his potential social mobility. Taking our 
lead from Mbembe (1992, Mbembe and Roitman, 1997) who saw the multiplication of identities 
as a performative tactics in what he calls the postcolony, the impersonating behaviour of Ivorian 
youngsters can be seen as an attempt to insinuate themselves in different spheres of activity in 
order “to keep the options open” (Simone, 2008a, Simone, 2008b). The ultimate task, which this 
paper can merely initiate, is to conceptualise this. 
The theoretical frame of the topography and performativity of the kind of juvenile impersonation 
observed above, consists of three related analytical concepts: articulation, navigation, and fields.  
Taking her lead from Gramsci and Hall, Tania Li (2007: 22) looks at identification as well as the 
social practice of 'political subjects' in terms of articulation, that is, "the multiple positions that 
people occupy, and the diverse powers they encounter." For research purposes, articulation "points 
rather to the necessity of teasing out, historically and ethnographically, the various ways in which 
room for manoeuvre is present but never unconstrained." (Li, 2000: 153). Navigation, as used by 
Vigh (2008) and Utas (2005, Utas and Jörgel, 2008), partly based on Honwana (2000: 77-78) and 
De Certeau (De Certeau, 1984), is precisely conceived in order to account for this 'room for 
manoeuvre'. Situations of crisis, according to Vigh  (2008: 18) "force agents to take into account 
not only how they are able to move within a social environment, but also how the social 
environment moves them, and other agents within it, as they seek to traverse envisioned 
trajectories.” Navigation implies  a dialogical relationship between actors and their social 
environments, hence some more attention needs to be given to the actual constitution of the terrain 
on which it takes place. Between overstressing stability and predictability  and merely 
characterising actors' mobility as "motion within motion", an intermediate position seems possible 
which acknowledges that flow and fixity constitute each other as much as mobility rests upon 
structures of immobility  (Lien and Melhuus, 2007: ix, Hedetoft and Hjort, 2002). In order to 
make this into more than a truism, we need some concept of 'field' without – and here I agree with 
Vigh – adopting the rather heavy and static concept Bourdieu made of it. Instead, our analyses of 
tactical agency may profit from a rather open, dynamical notion of field which helps to identify 
and map 'terrains' in terms of the stakes and opportunities they contain, the competencies they 
value and the expectation they nourish. Taken as such a field largely corresponds with Turner‟s 
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definition of it as "an ensemble of relationships between actors antagonistically oriented toward 
the same prizes or values (in this case control over the state apparatus)" (Turner, 1974: 135). The 
dynamical and open nature of such a field allows, above all, to register how these fields alter 
through the incursions of 'navigating' actors – as well as other external interventions (Martin, 
2003). As far as the identification of fields is concerned, contemporary field theory allows us to 
define fields rather loosely and according to specific analytical needs, more or less as 'spheres of 
activity' or 'registers of social action' in the Weberian sense (Lahire, 1999) even related to 
particular social networks  (Breiger, 2004). In this paper I have focused mainly on the corps 
habillés  as a field and ventured into interrelated fields such as popular culture, media, and popular 
politics.  
Afterthoughts in lieu of a conclusion 
The first months of the new Ouattara administration has witnessed a series of far-reaching 
interventions into public space. Within days of taking power, Alassane Ouattara ordered the FRCI 
to clear out and destroy La Sorbonne, signalling the imminent demise of the dozens of popular 
parliaments in Abidjan and other urban centres in Côte d‟Ivoire. More recently (August 2011), 
Yopougon saw the demolition of large sections of the Rue Princesse, Abidjan‟s archetypal night 
life hot spot and breeding ground of world-famous music genres such as Mapouka, Coupé-Décalé, 
and Ivorian Rap. The destruction of these sites of popular culture and popular politics makes us 
realise the extent to which over the last decade public life, at least the pro-Gbagbo part of it, they 
had been flourishing in a novel and vigorous human infrastructure and built environment. Two 
items of this public culture – generally labelled „Nouchi‟ – which rose to prominence and 
proliferated in many different guises in this milieu, were gbôhi and „bluff‟.  
In this paper, „bluff‟ was presented as a key performative tactics in a broader politics of 
impersonation of subaltern urbanites concerned with their ever threatened social mobility. In the 
hands of the thousands of members of patriotic youth militias, „bluffing‟ had the corps habillés as 
its target and took the form of a tenacious and sometimes fatal, impersonation of military postures, 
discourse and practices. The cases of Ato Belly, but above all of Marcus Garvey demonstrate how 
unrewarding this politics of impersonation was and how it merely resulted in a state of enduring 
apprenticeship without full mastery or ongoing „companionship‟ without properly „joining in‟. 
The latter observations bring us to the gbôhi, the second important item of urban public life which 
flourished during the Gbagbo era. Gbôhi thrived in Nouchi in the years since 2000 as a new term 
for „gang‟ derived from the Dyula term for „house‟, „gbo‟. Simultaneously, it was adopted in 
militia circles as the key-term for referring to the intricate process of networking: the fission and 
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fusion of  groups and „groupuscules‟, the continuous fragmenting and merging of formal self-
defence groups as well as the formation and disintegration of smaller factions, of bands of friends, 
and of ad hoc squads of youth militia members offering their „violent labour‟ to state and non-
state actors. The cases of Marcus Garvey and Ato Belly not only illustrate the vibrancy of 
networking but also revealed the double dynamics of subaltern „big-manity‟ involved in this: the 
search of groups for leadership and patronage as well as the quest of different types of leaders to 
gather and coach „elements‟, merge factions, and federate militia groups. 
By choosing to approach the problematic of networks in conflict situations within a perspective of 
impersonation and social mobility, I have tried to bring out both the geographical and historical 
specificity of militia-formation in the Ivoirian conflict of the preceding decade and its universality 
in terms of juvenile subalternity and postcolonial urbanity. 
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